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Abstract: We present a fiber-based continuous-variable quantum key
distribution system. In the scheme, a quantum signal of two non-orthogonal
weak optical coherent states is sent through a fiber-based quantum chan-
nel. The receiver simultaneously measures conjugate quadratures of the
light using two homodyne detectors. From the measured Q-function of
the transmitted signal, we estimate the attenuation and the excess noise
caused by the channel. The estimated excess noise originating from the
channel and the channel attenuation including the quantum efficiency
of the detection setup is investigated with respect to the detection of
effective entanglement. The local oscillator is considered in the verifica-
tion. We witness effective entanglement with a channel length of up to 2km.
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1. Introduction
“Kerckhoffs’ principle” [1] and Shannon’s assumption “The enemy knows the system” [2] es-
tablished the basis for modern cryptography and enhanced secure communication between two
parties. With the proposal of the “one time pad” [3], the security aspect shifted from secure
communication to secure key distribution between these two parties. Quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD), first proposed 1984 [4], offers a way to exchange a secret key using the quantum
mechanical properties of light as the carrier of information. The security is thereby based on
fundamental physical concepts.
First proof of principle experiments for QKD [5, 6, 7] were followed by practical im-
plementations over long and extremely long distances [8, 9, 10, 11]. In parallel to these
discrete-variable QKD systems, continuous-variable QKD using homodyne detection was pro-
posed [12]. It was shown, that the limit of 3 dB channel attenuation can be overcome by
the concept of postselection [13] and the postprocessing method reverse reconciliation [14].
Continuous-variable QKD has been tested on quantum channels of up to 25˙km length [15, 16]
using homodyne detection and basis switching. Besides using a single homodyne detection, also
simultaneous detection of both conjugate quadratures of the signal was demonstrated [17, 18].
Homodyne detection of conjugate quadratures referred to as heterodyne detection is particularly
interesting for three reasons:
• Random numbers are not needed in the receiver’s setup.
• The Trojan-horse attack [19], where Eve gains information by reading the basis choice
in Bob’s setup, is not possible.
• The heterodyne detection strategy achieves higher secure bit rates than schemes with
homodyne detection in some QKD protocols [20, 21, 22].
Experiments using heterodyne detection on a long fiber channel, however, had not yet been
demonstrated.
In this paper, we present a fiber-based QKD-system using a double-homodyne detection
setup. As in previous experiments [17, 23], we use binary encoded continuous-variable quan-
tum states consisting of a signal mode and a local oscillator mode. We adapt our previous
polarization-based experiments to a fiber channel. To this end, our two mode states are sent
through the quantum channel using a combination of time [15] and polarization multiplex-
ing [16] of signal and local oscillator (LO). Therefore, detrimental effects from photon-phonon
interactions (GAWBS) are avoided [24]. By describing the sent quantum information in the
Stokes space [25], it is possible to verify effective entanglement in the measurement data ac-
cording to the method in [26]. In contrast to all previous experiments, not only the signal but
also the strong reference beam (LO) is considered in this security analysis. We show how to
measure conjugate Stokes parameters with a freely drifting interferometric phase. The phase
drift is monitored by additional classical calibration pulses on the quantum channel. Subse-
quently, Bob remaps his measurement data, similar to [16]. Finally, monitoring the intensity of
the local oscillator at the detection stage allows us to unambiguously demonstrate the genera-
tion of quantum-correlated data.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our protocol and the Stokes
formalism. In Section 3, we describe the setup focusing on the implementation of the detec-
tion part. In Section 4, noise characteristics of the system and the transmitted signal states are
presented. Finally, the entanglement criterion is applied.
Fig. 1. (left) Schematics of the QKD setup, (right) the detection part is a random phase
heterodyne detection using the polarization degree of freedom. Our scheme is similar to a
technique called linear optical sampling [27]. In contrast to their system, we have a shot
noise limited detection and a SNR improvement of about 40 dB.
2. The protocol
Our protocol is a continuous-variable adaptation of the two-state protocol proposed by Ben-
nett [28]. Alice wishes to share a random bit string with Bob and starts by encoding binary
information in the phase of coherent states. These two signal states |α〉 and |−α〉 are transmit-
ted through a quantum channel and evolve to the output states ρ0 and ρ1, which are detected by
Bob in a heterodyne setup. Bob records the expectation values and variances of two orthogonal
quadratures, which allows him to reconstruct a bit value from each signal and to estimate the
information potentially extracted by an eavesdropper. A detailed account of the classical data
processing necessary to distill a secret key from the raw measurement outcomes is presented in
Ref. [29].
This two-state protocol is attractive from an experimental point of view, since the signal
preparation is the simplest possible. Theoretically, lower bounds on the achievable secret key
rate have been evaluated in Ref. [29]. Unfortunately, those results are not applicable to practical
scenarios, since the key rate drops too quickly with increasing excess noise. The theory needs
further development to make the protocol more robust against noise.
Here, we show that our experiment can establish quantum correlations in the classical data
held by Alice and Bob, which is a necessary precondition for the distillation of a secret key [30].
The existence of quantum correlations is proven through the verification of so-called effective
entanglement [31], a theoretically constructed, alternative description of the signal source. In
this description, Alice prepares bipartite states
|Ψ〉AB = 1√2 (|0〉A|α〉B + |1〉A|−α〉B). (1)
Her subsequent orthogonal projective measurements {|0〉A〈0|, |1〉A〈1|} effectively prepare the
signal states | ±α〉B, with equal probability. The action of the quantum channel on the state
|Ψ〉AB leads to an effective bipartite quantum state ρAB shared by Alice and Bob. It is their task
to prove that the classical measurement data must come exclusively from entangled ρAB, i.e.,
their data is quantum correlated.
Due to the discrete-continuous structure of the setup, we use the Expectation Value Matrix
method [26, 32] to verify the existence of quantum correlations. In this method, all measured
expectation values are stored in a matrix, and the separability of this matrix is linked to the
separability of the possible underlying quantum states. For a detailed description, the reader is
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Fig. 2. Curves show lower bounds for quantum correlations. The variance of the Stokes
operators is normalized by the local oscillator intensity resulting in the normalized variance
Var( ˆS2,3)/〈nˆLO〉. The different curves correspond to different channel transmissions η .
Effective entanglement is verified in the shaded areas.
referred to Ref. [26]. Reference [26] also reveals a vulnerability of the protocol arising from
an attack on the local oscillator mode. In a homodyne setup, the assumption that the local
oscillator is a strong coherent state allows us to regard the measurement as the single-mode
detection of the signal’s quadrature [33]. Precisely this assumption allows Eve to perform an
intercept-resend attack which modifies the intensities of signal and local oscillator modes. Such
an attack will not show in Bob’s quadrature detection, but could lead to data which is, at best,
classically correlated and therefore not suitable for key generation.
To take this into account, we consider the binary signals as true two-mode states | ±α〉⊗
|αLO〉 and we regard the homodyne detection as a measurement of the quantum Stokes operators
ˆS1 = aˆ†LOaˆLO− aˆ†SaˆS = nˆLO− nˆs (2)
ˆS2 = aˆ†LOaˆS + aˆ
†
SaˆLO
ˆS3 = i(aˆ†SaˆLO− aˆ†LOaˆS).
The protocol gives access to the expectation values and variances of two of the Stokes operators,
say ˆS2 and ˆS3. Then, a suitable Expectation Value Matrix is constructed as follows [26]:
χ(ρAB) =


〈
|0〉〈0|⊗B
〉
ρAB
〈
|0〉〈1|⊗B
〉
ρAB〈
|1〉〈0|⊗B
〉
ρAB
〈
|1〉〈1|⊗B
〉
ρAB

 (3)
with
B =

ˆ1B ˆS2 ˆS3ˆS2 ˆS22 ˆS2 ˆS3
ˆS3 ˆS3 ˆS2 ˆS23

 . (4)
Separability of the underlying state is then tested through the condition
χ(ρAB)TA ≥ 0, (5)
and violation of this certifies effective entanglement. The remaining Stokes operator ˆS1 enters
the Expectation Value Matrix through the symmetrizing step ˆS2 ˆS3 = ( ˆS2 ˆS3+ ˆS3 ˆS2)/2+( ˆS2 ˆS3−
ˆS3 ˆS2)/2 = { ˆS2, ˆS3}/2+ i ˆS1, which is instrumental to the verification process. However, due to
practical reasons, the expectation value 〈 ˆS1〉 is not directly measured in our experiment, and
instead, we measure the photon number in the local oscillator mode (monitor B in Fig. 1(left)).
We now show how this detour can provide a lower bound on 〈 ˆS1〉:
Direct calculation leads to the relation
ˆS22 + ˆS23 = 2( ˆS0 + 2nˆLOnˆs), (6)
where ˆS0 is defined as the total intensity nˆs + nˆLO. Equation (6) contains two quantities which
are not directly accessible in our experiment, namely ˆS0 and nˆs. The latter is easily replaced by
the relation
nˆs =
1
2
( ˆS0− ˆS1), (7)
leading to
ˆS1 = ˆS0(1+
1
nˆLO
)−
ˆS22 + ˆS23
2nˆLO
. (8)
Finally, we use the relation 〈 ˆS0〉 ≥ 〈nˆLO〉 to arrive at the desired bound
〈 ˆS1〉 ≥ 1+ 〈nˆLO〉− 〈
ˆS22 + ˆS23〉
2〈nˆLO〉 . (9)
At this point, we can directly apply the Expectation Value Matrix method to verify the existence
of quantum correlations, using the approximation (9) instead of the actual value of 〈 ˆS1〉. Figure
2 shows the noise levels for different choices of input intensities, under the assumption that
the noise is equal for both quadratures and both signal states. The variances are normalized by
〈nˆLO〉 to make the results independent of the local oscillator intensity. We observe that more
noise can be tolerated when smaller signal amplitudes are chosen. Channel losses decrease the
tolerable excess noise for quantum-correlated data.
3. Experimental Setup
In this section, we first describe Alice’s and Bob’s optical hardware. We then separately discuss
the detection scheme and finally explain the control software.
3.1. Optical setup
The optical setup of our QKD-system is shown in Fig. 1. The Alice module consists of a diode
laser (SLT5411 from Sumitomo Electronic Industries as used in [34]) pulsed by a self-made
pulsed current supply. The laser pulses are approximately 100 ns long and have a wavelength
of 1549.3 nm. The line width is 6.6 GHz at -10 dB of optical power and the coherence time
is estimated with self-homodyning to be 0.2 ns. The laser pulses are split asymmetrically in
the LO and the signal arm. The smaller fraction is used for the signal preparation. The signal
arm consists of a delay fiber, a Mach-Zehnder modulator for amplitude modulation, a moni-
tor detector, and an optical attenuator. This results in a shot noise limited weak signal at the
single photon level. In the second fiber beamsplitter (BS) the LO pulses and the signal pulses
are spatially combined with a 500 ns time shift. Additionally, the polarization of the pulses is
chosen orthogonal. The last component in the Alice setup is a computer controlled polarization
controller pre-compensating the slow polarization drift in the fiber channel.
In the Bob module the signal is demultiplexed with a polarizing beamsplitter (PBS). We
control the second port of the PBS with a physical block to ensure the second input mode is in
a vacuum state. The LO passes a delay fiber, while the signal is directly sent to the free-space
detection setup. A monitor diode behind a highly reflective mirror measures the LO energy
pulse by pulse. The polarization control is set such that the power on the monitor diode is
maximized. Finally the signal is measured with our detection scheme shown in (Fig. 1 (right)).
3.2. Detection System
The detection system in Fig. 1 (right) consists of two homodyne detectors detecting two conju-
gate quadratures of the signal mode simultaneously. This was first investigated in [36, 37, 38].
Our scheme consists of free-space optics and therefore allows for easy and lossless manipu-
lations of the polarization. The LO’s polarization is then chosen to be circular. The signal’s
polarization is tilted by 45◦ with respect to H and V polarization. Both beams interfere on a
polarization independent 50:50 beam splitter with acute angle of incidence.
For the H-polarized component, we label the relative phase between the signal and the bright
LO φH = φI , where φI originates from interferometer drifts in sender and receiver modules.
The phase shift of pi/2 between two orthogonally polarized LO components results in a relative
phase for the V-components of φV = φI +pi/2. Both beams propagate to a PBS, which separates
the H- and V-polarization. The reflected V-components impinge on the first homodyne detector
(HD1), while the transmitted H-components impinge on the second homodyne detector (HD2).
The difference of the photo currents is recorded.
Commonly, homodyne detectors are treated as quadrature detectors. We calculate the photon
number difference nˆHD1− detected by HD1 using the linearized field operators aˆS = α · ˆ1+ δ aˆS
and aˆLO = αLO · ˆ1+ δ aˆLO. We assume that αLO and α are real and αLO ≫ α . Additionally, the
modes S⊥ and LO⊥, the modes orthogonally polarized to signal and LO, are in a vacuum state,
i.e. aˆS⊥ = δ aˆS⊥ and aˆLO⊥ = δ aˆLO⊥ . The last assumption is justified, since the other input port of
the PBS is under Bob’s control. The detected signal is found after a straightforward calculation
to be
nˆHD1− =
1
2
(
(aˆLOe
iφI + aˆLO⊥e
iφI )†(aˆS + aˆS⊥) (10)
+(aˆS + aˆS⊥)
†(aˆLOeiφI + aˆLO⊥e
iφI )
)
= αLO
(
cos(φI) ·α + δ ˆXS,φI + δ ˆXS⊥
)
,
where ˆXM,φ = 12 (aˆ
†
Me
iφ + aˆMe−iφ ) is a quadrature operator for mode M with a phase φ . This
quadrature measurement is derived analogously for HD2. It reads
nˆHD2− =
1
2
(
(aˆLOe
iφI+pi/2− aˆLO⊥eiφI+pi/2)†(aˆS− aˆS⊥) (11)
+(aˆS− aˆS⊥)†(aˆLOeiφI+pi/2− aˆLO⊥eiφI+pi/2)
)
= αLO
(
cos(φI +pi/2) ·α+ δ ˆXS,φI+pi/2 + δ ˆXS⊥
)
.
The vacuum input S⊥ at the PBS adds additional 3 dB noise to the variance of the measurement.
Therefore our setup is equivalent to a standard heterodyne detection. We do not stabilize the
interferometric phase φI but let it drift freely. However, we have an inherent stabilization of the
relative phase of φH−φV = pi/2. Therefore two random but conjugate quadratures are measured
with HD1 and HD2.
The simultaneous measurement of two conjugate quadratures depends strongly on the proper
choice of the polarization of signal and LO in the detection setup. For balancing, a linearly
polarized LO is equally split to both homodyne detectors. A weak signal beam is then sent into
the detection scheme. The quadrature measurements of 4000 signals are averaged and the mean
values are plotted in the two-dimensional measurement space of Fig. 3(a). Phase drifts of the
interferometric phase will result in elliptical or circular graphs, depending on the angle of the
quarter wave plate (QWP) in the LO path, corresponding to largely correlated measurements
(elliptical) and uncorrelated measurements (circular). It is easy to show, that by turning the
QWP, two quadratures with arbitrary relative angle can be measured. We desire uncorrelated
measurements (orange trace in Fig. 3(a)).
(a) (b)
Fig. 3. (a) Lissajous figure of a phase randomized signal is measured for different settings
of the QWP in the setup. If the measured quadratures Xψ and Xφ are not orthogonal, the
shape of the graph will be elliptical. We demonstrate that orthogonal quadratures are meas-
ured for the correct QWP angle (orange trace). (b) The phase is estimated from blocks
of calibration pulses. The figure shows the standard deviation of the phase drift between
different calibration blocks.
3.3. Electronics and Automatization
In the following, we describe the electronic hardware, the control software and the steps in the
postprocessing. The Alice electronics is essentially a 14-bit-D/A-converter to prepare the signal
with a sampling rate of 20 MS/s. One port drives the laser with a pulse rate of 1 MHz. Another
port produces rectangular pulses for the amplitude modulator. A third port synchronizes Bob’s
experiment with an electronic clock signal at approximately 1 kHz. The clock could be substi-
tuted for a synchronization using the LO monitor diode and calibration pulses as time stamp in
future experiments.
A quaternary modulation is applied to the amplitude modulator to create the states |α〉, |−α〉,
|αcal〉 and |−αcal〉, where α is the signal amplitude and αcal is the amplitude of brighter “classi-
cal” calibration pulses sent along with the signal. The pulse pattern consists of four calibration
pulses followed by 28 signal pulses.
To pre-compensate the polarization drift, we inserted the polarization control in Alice’s setup.
An optimal separation of signal and LO is obtained by maximizing the LO power on the monitor
diode. The power is maximized either manually or with Bob’s PC using a simplex method [35].
This demultiplexing method is very stable. It is furthermore lossless as opposed to a coupler
with fixed splitting ratio [15].
In the following, we describe the electronic circuits. The difference signal in the homodyne
detectors is amplified by charge sensitive amplifiers as in the design by [39]. The electrical
pulse duration produced by the detectors is set to 400 ns (foot), which allows for repetition rates
up to 2 MHz while maintaining linear amplification. The linearity was confirmed for all four
photodiodes independently. Due to limitations of computing power, and an electronic signal
due to LO light leaking into the signal arm, we run the experiment at 1 MHz. When varying the
LO power for balanced homodyne detection of vacuum, we find a linear behavior of the signal
variance versus the LO intensity. For typical LO power of 108 photons/pulse, the electronic
noise is 20 dB below the signals variance. The common mode rejection ratio is always better
that 40 dB. The detection efficiency of the homodyne detectors was 70%, including the quantum
efficiency of the diodes (86%), the mode matching efficiency (95.4%) and the loss in optical
components (10%).
Bob’s 12-bit-A/D-converter digitizes the signal and the LO monitor detectors with 16 MS/s.
We reduce the number of samples by neglecting samples in between the pulses 1 and averaging
8 samples (approximately the electronic pulse length). These mean values are used to estimate
the shot noise level, as shown in Eqn. (9). In the postprocessing, we estimate the mean value
of the Stokes operators ˆS2 and ˆS3 for 1024 signal states. The displacement with respect to this
mean value is considered as quantum signal. Long term fluctuations of the detector are thereby
compensated.
The interferometric phase φI is estimated with the four bright calibration pulses in each 32-
pulse-frame. To measure the phase noise, we calculate the phase drift between two calibration
steps. We show the standard deviation of the phase drift in Fig. 3(b). We find that for weak
calibration pulses the standard deviation depends on the calibration pulse amplitude. This stems
from the limit for the phase estimation of weak coherent states [40]. For stronger amplitudes,
the standard deviation of the phase drift is measured to be 4 degree for calibration times of
32 µs. With the estimated phase, we remap the coordinate system of the measured frame to the
phase space of Alice’s signal states. Subsequently, the data can be analyzed as described in the
next section. The computational power needed for the complete postprocessing is high, but at
1MHz repetition rate the system runs continuously in realtime, as required for practical use in
a QKD system.
4. Verification of Effective Entanglement
Reformulating the measurement in the Stokes representation (see Eqns. (2)) is of great impor-
tance for the security analysis of the system. We find that Eqns. (10) and (11) have the form
of a simultaneous Stokes measurement of the ˆSφ - and the ˆSφ+pi/2-operator, respectively, where
ˆSθ = ˆS2 cosθ + ˆS3 sinθ . The Stokes operator ˆS1 is estimated by the monitor diode, as shown in
Eqn. (9).
To verify the effective entanglement in our experiment, we compare the measured excess
noise to the theoretical upper noise bounds (see Fig. 2). The excess noise estimation demands
a calibration step. The standard procedure to calibrate the shotnoise level is to probe vacuum.
Therefore, we physically block the signal arm of the detection stage and monitor the noise
power of the Stokes measurements, as well as the signal of the LO monitor diode. The shot-
noise estimation thus corresponds to a measurement of the electronic gains in the detection
system using a well known and low noise light beam2. In standard homodyne detection, the
variance of the shot noise will then scale with the power of the LO in following measurements.
However, a new aspect is introduced in Eqn. (9): If there is significant noise power in the ˆS2- or
ˆS3-component of the signal states, the bound on 〈 ˆS1〉 will deteriorate, and with it the ability to
detect quantum correlations. We estimate the contribution of the last term in Eqn. (9). We con-
sider the worst case, i.e. the maximal reduction of the expectation value in each measurement
run for a single amplitude (5 million signal pulses).
〈 ˆS22〉
〈nˆLO〉 +
〈 ˆS23〉
〈nˆLO〉 ≤
γLO
γ2S2
max
(
〈uˆ2S2〉
〈uˆLO〉
)
+
γLO
γ2S3
max
(
〈uˆ2S3〉
〈uˆLO〉
)
, (12)
where γSi , uˆSi , γLO and uˆLO are gains and output voltages of the detectors for the ˆSi-components
(i = 2,3) and the LO power, respectively. The calibration measurement is used to measure the
gain ratio. For an approximately shot noise limited beam we find
1In a QKD system the removed samples should be checked for manipulation attacks.
2If the LO has traveled through the eavesdropper’s regime, it is mandatory to verify that the beam exhibits small
excess noise compared to the detector’s common mode rejection ratio, e.g. with an attenuation measurement [41].
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Fig. 4. Alice and Bob are connected back to back. (a) Combined Q-function generated from
5 million pulses with amplitudes αS = 0.5 (b) Q-functions for each signal state. (c) Excess
noise estimated from Q-function for varying signal amplitudes. (d) Average excess noise
(circles) compared to the bounds given by the entanglement criterion (solid line), shown
with the 3-sigma confidentiality interval (dashed lines).
γLO
γ2Si
∆2uˆSi,snl
〈uˆLO,snl〉 =
∆2 ˆSi,snl
〈nˆLO,snl〉 = 1. (13)
The reduction of the normalized expectation value is fluctuating during the measurements.
However, using Eqns. (12) and (13), we calculated that it never surpasses 10−3. This factor
is considered by shifting the bound for the entanglement verification. Another uncertainty in
the level of shotnoise is the estimation error of the LO power. The LO power is measured for
every signal pulse separately and therefore has a rather large standard deviation of 6 ·10−3. We
consider the deviation by plotting the three sigma confidence interval around the upper noise
bound.
In our first measurement, we connected both modules back to back. The effective detection
efficiency is therefore merely the 70% efficiency of the receiver module. The Q-functions are
measured for the two signal states combined or separately as shown in Fig. 4(a) and (b), re-
spectively. From the Q-functions, we estimate the mean value and the variance for both Stokes
opertors of both signal states as shown in Fig. 4(c). We find that the variances are approximately
equal. Their average variance is therefore compared to the upper bound of the variance given
by the Expectation Value Matrix method. The comparison of upper bound and average variance
is shown in 4(d). We find, that for all tested signal amplitudes the measured noise is below the
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Fig. 5. Alice and Bob are connected with a 2 km optical fiber. (a) Excess noise estimated
from Q-function measurement for varying signal amplitudes. (b) Average excess noise (cir-
cles) compared to the bounds given by the entanglement criterion (solid line), shown with
the 3-sigma confidentiality interval (dashed lines).
3-sigma confidentiality interval. Therefore the effective entanglement is verified.
We then substitute the 2 m quantum channel with a 2 km standard optical fiber. The effective
detection efficiency was 44.8%. The transmission of the channel decreases to 64% also due
to additional splices. In an optimized setting, this attenuation corresponds to at least 10 km of
fiber. Again, we estimate the mean values and the variance for both Stokes opertors of both
signal states as shown in Fig. 5(a). Finally, we compare the average values to the upper bound
of the variance given by the Expectation Value Matrix method (Fig. 5(b)). We find that for
signal amplitudes below 0.45, effective entanglement is verified in our system.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, we present a fiber-based continuous-variable quantum key distribution system.
We demonstrate a receiver module, which simultaneously measures conjugate Stokes operators
of light. This is the first simultaneous detection of conjugate Stokes operator of a quantum sig-
nal after a fiber channel. From the measured Q-function of the transmitted signal, we estimate
the attenuation and the excess noise caused by the channel. For the measured amount of excess
noise, the theory has not progressed far enough to generate an unconditionally secure and secret
key. Nevertheless, we successfully witness effective entanglement with a channel length of up
to 2km considering both parts of the quantum signal, the signal and the LO mode.
6. Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank Georgy Onishchukov for fruitful discussions and complemen-
tary hardware.
